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Abstract (English) 
 
Our thesis is dealing with changes in the stock markets in Europe during the 
European Sovereign debt crisis from the 1st of January 2010 to the 31st of November 
2011. We ask which types of news influence the stock markets and whether the 
origin of this news matters. We therefore consider the top 20 movements of the stock 
exchanges of the Euro zone countries and relate these using regression analysis to 
the type of the news, its nature (if it is good or bad) and its origin. The seminal study 
using this approach was published in 1998 by Graciela L. Kaminsky and Sergio L. 
Schmuckler “What triggers market jitters? “A chronicle of the Asia Crisis”. Their focus 
lay on the Asian crisis. We apply their method on European stock markets during the 
European government debt crisis since this approach was not as yet done.  
We give a short overview of the budget situation of these countries and try to sketch 
how the solution for this crisis could look like.  
Our main results are that political news have a great influence and that in general 
bad news lead to higher swings on the stock exchange markets. Domestic news 
dominates for political news, economic news and monetary policy. Also there is no 
difference if the news are originated in a crisis state or a non-crisis state.  
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Abstract (German) 
 
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Veränderungen der europäischen 
Aktienmärkte während der europäischen Schuldenkrise.  
Unsere Fragestellung ist, welche Arten von Nachrichten die ausgewählten Leitindizes 
der Länder beeinflussen und ob die Herkunft der Nachrichten eine Rolle spielt. Um 
die Menge der Daten für die Regressionsanalyse einzuschränken wählten wir die 20 
größten täglichen Veränderungen an den Börsen aus und testeten diese mit Hilfe 
einer Regressionsanalyse auf Unterschiede in Bezug auf Art der Nachrichten, 
Herkunft der Nachrichten beziehungsweise negative versus positive Nachrichten. 
Die Arbeit von Graciela L. Kaminsky und Sergio L. Schmuckler “What triggers market 
jitters? “A chronicle of the Asia Crisis” diente uns als Ideengeber für diese 
Magisterarbeit. Sie analysierten den Einfluss von Nachrichtenmeldungen auf die 
asiatischen Börsen während der Asienkrise Ende der 90er Jahre. Da noch keine 
vergleichbare Studie zur Analyse der Nachrichten während der europäischen 
Schuldenkrise gemacht wurde, griffen wir dieses Thema auf. 
Als Einführung in diese Thematik gehen wir auf vorhandene Literatur ein und zeigen 
deren Vor- beziehungsweise Nachteile auf. Danach folgt eine Zusammenfassung der 
Haushaltslage und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Euroländer und Lösungsansätze 
aus der Schuldenkrise. 
Die Ergebnisse unserer Regressionsanalyse besagen, dass der Einfluss der 
politischen Nachrichten am größten ist und dass schlechte Nachrichten die 
Aktienindizes stärker als gute beeinflussen. Außerdem stellte sich heraus dass es 
keinen Unterschied macht ob der Ursprung der Nachrichten von einem 
krisengebeutelten Land kam oder nicht. 
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Chapter 1 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The main topic that has dominated the media landscape – as well as our social life – 
over the last two years has been the debt crisis (especially the one of Greece) in 
Europe. As in every crisis, questions relating to the origin of the crisis and the 
behavior of the investors began to emerge.  
The different types of theories dealing with these questions are discussed in our 
thesis, but we will not restrict our work to one particular model of herding or 
fundamental behavior of investors – the aim of this thesis is to look at the reaction 
(positive as negative) of financial stock markets, no matter if it is just a rumor or if 
fundamental data is responsible for it.  
The problem that we consider is what type of news is responsible for large swings in 
the stock exchange. Where do these news have their origin? Does it matter if their 
nature is bad or good? Does it make a difference if the news originated in a crisis 
country?  
We think that these are important questions to solve as it makes it more clear to what 
news investors tend to listen more during times of crisis.   
The seminal study of this kind was done by Graciela L. Kaminsky and Sergio L. 
Schmuckler, What Triggers Market Jitters? (July 1998)1. In general they were 
analyzing the Asian crisis from the 1st of January 1997 until the end of May 1998 by 
picking out nine Asian stock markets that were affected by this crisis. To limit the vast 
amount of information they had available they concentrated on the twenty largest 
one-day changes (at a bearish or bullish market).  
In our work we also examine the top twenty largest one-day changes of the most 
important stock indices of the Euro- zone as this was not done before in any other 
paper. Therefore we have picked the countries that were mostly in the focus of the 
debt crisis: Austria, Germany, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and France. 
We find it important to do this to better understand how the news and international 
agreements influence the stock exchanges. One of our main results is that political 
stability is extremely important during crisis times. So politicians can show how good 
their leadership ability is and soften the swings on the stock exchange.   
                                               
1 The first version of this paper was in July 1998, but we are using an updated version from March 1999 
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Following this introduction we will make a review of the literature dealing also with the 
analysis of news. Then in chapter 2 we will give a summary of the European 
sovereign debt crisis – analyzing the financial situation of the countries and looking at 
the measurements and stabilization instruments of the European Union and other 
organizations. Chapter 3 deals with financial markets during a crisis – we will 
compare the volatility and means of stock indices during a crisis period and a non-
crisis period. After that (Chapter 4) we show our news in detail and how the data for 
the regression was prepared. There will also be some analysis of the different type of 
news and their origin. In chapter 5 we will run our regressions and analyze the 
results, while in the last chapter (Chapter 6) we will conclude. 
 
 
1.2. Review of the literature 
 
Hardly anyone can forecast the prices of the stock markets. Market performances are 
not entirely data driven. Only in a few cases is there a face-to-face transaction 
between the producer and the consumer2. In general you can say that industry 
performance, economic and political changes, inflation and trading strategies are the 
key factors of changing stock prices. A lot of papers have been written, dealing with 
the influence of quantitative information on stock market prices. For example the 
works done by Rohitha Goonatilake and Susantha Herath3 (they analyzed 
statistically the influence of news on the most important stocks indices in the US and 
found a connection between news items and the markets), Douglas K. Pearce and V. 
Vance Roley4 (they looked at how news regarding money supply, inflation, real 
economic activity and the discount rate affect the prices of the stocks), R. P. 
Castanias5 (he found out that the volatility of stock markets gets higher on days with 
the most economic news), Werner Antweiler and Murray Z. Frank6 (their paper is 
                                               
2 Sernau Scott, (2006). Worlds Apart: Social Inequality in a Global Economy, Second Edition, pp.40 
3 Goonatilake Rohitha, Herath S., (2007). The Volatility of the Stock Market and News, International 
Research Journal of Finance and Economics, Issue 11 
4 Pearce Douglas K., Roley V. Vance, (1985). Stock Prices and Economic News, Journal of Business, 
Vol. 58, No. 1, (January 1985), pp. 49-67  
5 Castanias R.P., (1979). Macroinformation and the variability of stock market prices, Journal of 
Finance, Vol.34, pp. 439-450 
6 Antweiler Werner, Murray Z. Frank, (2004). Is All That Talk Just Noise? The Information Content of 
Internet Stock Message Boards, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 59, Issue 3, pp. 1259–1294, June 
2004 
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dealing with news on internet stock message boards and how they affect the stock 
market), G. William Schwert7 (he showed that a higher volatility in times of a crisis 
can be explained by a greater variance of other economic data). 
One of the initial points, when researchers started to try to understand the 
movements of the stock markets was Keynes' work in the late 1930s where he 
described the phenomena of ”animal spirits”8. Generally he is measuring emotions 
that influence human behavior in terms of consumer confidence.  
 
“Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability 
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our 
positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than 
mathematical expectations, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. 
Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full 
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can 
only be taken as the result of animal spirits - a spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of 
quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”9 
Since then attention has been drawn to observe the dynamic effects that news and 
rumors and not just fundamental data have on stock prices. At that time one of the 
most innovative and influential works was done by Victor Niederhoffer (1971)10. It 
was the first work of this kind that showed that news related to world events11 affects 
movements of the stock market12. 
Richard Roll (1988) also dealt with the problem of predicting stock prices in his 
work13. He is clear about the fact that in general stock prices cannot be predicted and 
that the theory of efficient markets explains why they should be unpredictable (more 
                                               
7 Schwert G. William, (1989). Why does Stock Volatility Change over Time?, Journal of Finance, Vol. 
44 pp. 1115-1153 
8 Keynes John M., (1936). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, London. 
Macmillan. 
9 Keynes John M., (1936). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, London. 
Macmillan. pp. 161-162  
10 Niederhoffer Victor, (1971). The Analysis of World Events and Stock Prices, The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 193-219 
11 Niederhoffer declared as world news headlines in the New York Times that have a certain font size 
and their reliability. Also he installed a seven point good to bad scale to analyse the impact of the 
events he found. 
12 For his work he was using the S&P 500 
13 Roll Richard, (1988). R-Squared, Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 541-566 
8
 
 
about this later on). Nevertheless many financial economists141516 seem to believe 
that with authenticated information you can illustrate stock price movements ex post. 
If you can generate a model that perfectly fits the data you can follow that R-
squared17 has to be near 1 – this should also be the case for R-squared in Roll’s 
regression18. Roll looked into the largest firms of the US market and came to the 
conclusion that less than 40 percent of the monthly volatility can be explained like 
that. His results got worse when he was using daily return data. 
Cutler, et al. (1989)19 found similar results. They also looked at some distinctive world 
news and how the stock markets react to them and they came to the conclusion – 
accordingly to Roll – that it is hard to find news responsible for the market’s biggest 
swings.  
The importance of news data on the stock's prices can also be seen in numerous 
other recently published papers (like Pietro Veronesi [2000]20, Long Chen, Zhi Da 
and Xinlei Shelly Zhao [2012]21, Clara Vega [2006]22, X. Frank Zhang [2006]23, John 
Y. Campbell, Christopher Polk and Tuomo Vuolteenaho [2009]24 and also in the fact 
that in nearly every economic newspaper trends and volatility of stocks are 
examined: 
 
“One of the more fascinating sections of the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) is on the 
inside of the back page under the standing headline “Abreast of the Market.” There 
you can read each day what the market did yesterday, whether it went up, down or 
sideways as measured by indexes like the Dow Jones Industrial Average . . . . In that 
                                               
14 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., (2006). The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 42, pp. 203-243  
15 Blackwell, Marr Wayne, Spivey Michael F., (1990). Plant-Closing Decisions and the Market Value of 
the Firm, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 277-288 
16 Krishnaswami Sudha, Subramaniam Venkat, (1999). Information asymmetry, valuation and the 
corporate spin-off decisions, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 53, pp. 73-112 
17 R-squared shows if the regression line is near or far away from the points of a data set. If the R-
squared is 1.0 then the regression line perfectly matches the data. 
18 He uses a cross – sectional distribution of R-squared. 
19 Cutler D.M., Poterba J.M., Summers L.H., (1989). What moves stock prices?, Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 25, pp. 383-417 
20 Veronesi Pietro, (2000). How Does Information Quality Affect Stock Returns?, The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 55, No. 2, April 2000 
21 Long Chen, Xinlei Shelly Zhao, Zhi Da, (2012). What Drives Stock Price Movement?;  
22 Clara Vega, (2006). Stock price reaction to public and private information, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 82, pp. 103-133 
23 Zhang X. Frank, (2006). Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
61, No.1, February 2006 
24 Campbell John Y., Polk Christopher, Vouteenaho Tuomo, (2009). Growth or Glamour? 
Fundamentals and Systematic Risk in Stock Returns 
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column, you can also read selected post-mortems from explaining why the market 
yesterday did whatever it did, sometimes with predictive nuggets about what it will do 
today or tomorrow. This is where the fascination lies. For no matter what the market 
did—up, down or sideways—somebody will have a ready explanation.”25 
 
The above mentioned column “Abreast of the Media” from the Wall Street Journal 
was used by Tetlock (2007)26 to describe the correlation between the content of 
media reports and daily stock market activity. The reason for picking this source is 
that the Wall Street Journal is the biggest daily financial newspaper in the United 
States with a very high reputation among traders. With the help of General Inquirer, a 
computer assisted approach for content analysis of textual data, he examined the 
data from the Dow Jones Index between the years 1984 and 1999. This software 
labels each text file with counts on categories from a dictionary database. Words that 
are associated with pessimism are in the negative or weak category. When he found 
a bunch of such pessimistic news the market went down. This kind of work was 
somehow the beginning of the analysis of the so called ad – hoc news27. More and 
more funds manager that are doing algorithmic trading not just concentrate on trend 
following but they also implement analyzing the ad hoc news in their formula.  
The general question in finance that economics has been asking is why prices 
change in security markets. Therefore in 1970 Eugene Fama published in the Journal 
of Finance an influential article “Efficient Capital Markets“28 dealing with the efficient 
market hypothesis. This theory says that prices in the stocks market fully reflect all 
available information – so that it is not possible to earn more profits than the average 
market.  
This statement is quite debatable because traders or investors are picking a stock 
that is in their opinion undervalued compared to other stocks and in trading them they 
are going to make their profit. Also fund managers are always compared to a certain 
benchmark (for example a fund dealing with stocks in the German market – they are 
compared with the performance of the DAX) and DAX certainly have to outperform it 
                                               
25 Vermont Royster (Wall Street Journal, “Thinking Things Over Abaft of the Market”, January 15, 1986 
26 Tetlock Paul C., (2007). Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock 
Market, The Journal of finance, vol. 62, no. 3  june 2007 
27 Ad hoc news are news that have to be published by companies that are listed at a stock exchange if 
there is any new information that could be important for that company 
28 Fama Eugene F., (1970). Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, The 
Journal of finance, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 383-417 
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which stands in contrast to the efficient market hypothesis, that it is impossible to 
predictably outperform the market. The main reason for price changes is the 
upcoming of news, respectively new information. Following this a market can be 
called efficient if the prices adjust quickly, so current prices of securities show all 
available information at any time which means that the prices adjust before an 
investor has time to benefit from a news release.  
So how could it be explained that nowadays markets are nevertheless efficient? One 
of the reasons is that investors and traders are competing against each other in 
identifying over- or undervalued stock prices. Thus these people are spending a lot of 
time and resources to discover “wrongly” priced stocks. As more and more traders 
are looking for such opportunities to invest, the number detecting it becomes quite 
small.  
Trying to summarize the efficient market hypothesis in one sentence you could use 
the famous trading quote: “The market is always right“. All stocks in an efficient 
market are “rightly” priced. 
11
Chapter 2 
2.1. The European debt crisis 
 
What we do now is give a short overview of how the crisis started, looking at some 
countries in particular and summarize the function of the aid mechanism of the 
European Union and IMF.   
The center of this crisis is Greece, a country which was and still is near bankruptcy. 
You cannot name a clear date when the crisis started but roughly you can say that it 
set in at the beginning of the year 2010 with the disclosure of Greece's actual deficit 
and its excessive financial leverage. The inevitable consequence of the massive 
deficit spending was presented in the form of increased interest rates on government 
bonds. As shown in the following tables not only Greece had to suffer under high 
deficit spending. The consequence was a contagion effect of many Euro zone 
countries, which already had an excessive level of debt (Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy). With the support of the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the ESM 
(European Stabilization Mechanism), so-called rescue packages have been 
established, in order to avoid national insolvency of certain countries. 
 
 
2.2. The financial situation of the eight sample countries 
 
In order to be a member of the Euro-zone a country has to fulfill special convergence 
criteria – the so called Maastricht criteria. Two major points are that the deficit each 
year should not be higher than 3 percent of GDP and that the total deficit should not 
exceed 60 percent of GDP. Looking at tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 you see the deficit, the 
debt level and the growth rate of GDP for each country in the sample in certain years.  
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Table 2.1: National Government Budgets (in percent of GDP) 
  * estimation 
     
Country 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 
Austria -4,5 -2,6 -3 -1,9 
France -7,1 -5,2 -4,5 -4,2 
Germany -4,3 -1 -0,9 -0,7 
Greece -10,3 -9,1 -7,3 -8,4 
Ireland -31,2 -13,1 -8,3 -7,5 
Italy -4,6 -3,9 -2 -1,1 
Portugal -9,8 -4,2 -4,7 -3,1 
Spain -9,3 -8,5 -6,4 -6,3 
 
Source: European Commission    
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2: National Government Debt Levels (in percent of GDP) 
 
  * estimation 
     
Country 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 
Austria 62,9 65,2 70,1 73 
France 82,3 85,8 90,5 92,5 
Germany 83 81,2 82,2 80,7 
Greece 145 165,3 160,6 168 
Ireland 92,5 108,2 116,1 120,2 
Italy 118,6 120,1 123,5 121,8 
Portugal 93,3 107,8 113,9 117,1 
Spain 61,2 68,5 80,9 87 
 
Source: European Commission    
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Table 2.3: National Economic Growth (in percent of GDP) 
 
  * estimation 
     
Country 2010 2011 2012* 2013* 
Austria 2,3 3,1 0,8 1,7 
France 1,5 1,7 0,5 1,3 
Germany 3,7 3 0,7 1,7 
Greece -3,5 -6,9 -4,7 0 
Ireland -0,4 0,7 0,5 1,9 
Italy 1,8 0,4 -1,4 0,4 
Portugal 1,4 -1,6 -3,3 0,3 
Spain -0,1 0,7 -1,8 -0,3 
 
Source: European Commission    
 
 
 
France, Greece, Ireland and Spain have quite a high budget deficit and the forecasts 
are saying that they will continue to stay at such a level. Looking at the debt level 
Greece is by far on top of the list with 168 percent. Germany is the only country that 
(if the forecasts come true) will remain with its level around 80 percent (which is still 
higher than the convergence criteria of 60 percent). According to this forecast of the 
European Commission the economy in these countries will more or less start in the 
year 2013 to come out of recession or their low growth period.  
 
When you are looking at this data it is clear that the premium against a country's 
bailout – Credit Default Swap (CDS)29 – gets higher. 
Now let’s take a look how this situation had happened in these countries: 
 
 
  
                                               
29 This is a financial instrument for trading credit risks between two parties. One side (the buyer) of a 
credit default swap gets a credit protection where else the other side (the seller) ensures the credit 
value of the debt securities. 
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2.2.1. Ireland 
 
In 2007 the deficit of Ireland was around 25 percent of GDP. In 2009 it reached the 
mark of €180 billion, meaning 65.8 percent of its GDP – exceeding the convergence 
criteria (which is at 60 percent).  
If you are comparing the budget situation for these two years you see that in 2007 
there was still a surplus of 0.3 percent, which deteriorated to a deficit of 12.5 percent 
of GDP in 2009. In the context of the world recession the housing bubble in Ireland 
blew up and Ireland's economy was one of the first nations to head towards a 
recession in 2008. The case of Ireland got worse as Ireland also suffered a lot under 
the bank crisis (with a focus on the Anglo Irish Bank). On the 21st of November 2010 
the prime minster Brian Cowen asked the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the 
European Union for financial support. At a special meeting of the Euro-group and the 
finance ministers of the European Union at the 27th to 28th of November in Brussels, 
Ireland was granted a credit worth of €85 billion over 36 months. The credit should be 
given to Ireland in quarterly rates, as the European Union and the IMF combined the 
credit with certain conditions of reducing the deficit of Ireland's household. One of the 
points would have also been to higher the country's low corporate tax rate but the 
government intervened successfully against it. According to the calculation of the IMF 
the record deficit of 32 percent of GDP for the year 2010 should shrink to around 10 
percent of GDP in the year 2011. 
 
 
2.2.2. Italy 
 
The case of Italy is somehow different. The country always had a high total deficit 
relative to its GDP. In 2004 the deficit was at 106 percent, which was the highest in 
the European Union. It was a bit reduced to 103.5 percent of GDP in 2007, but in 
2009 it got a significant boost to a level of 114.6 percent. The Italian government tried 
to avoid more deficits and managed to get some positive results with modest 
increases of the total deficit to 117 percent of GDP in 2010 and 118 percent of the 
GDP in 2011. Nevertheless after Greece, the debt-GDP ratio is the second highest in 
the Eurozone. The advantage is that concerning UniCredit30 only 42 percent of Italian 
                                               
30 an Italian bank 
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debt is held by foreigners whereas more than three quarters of Greek debts are held 
by foreign investors. The average level of debt of the Italian households is at 57 
percent of the available income (compared to an average of 93 percent in the 
Eurozone).  
Also the Italian government really tried hard to battle its new indebtedness. At the 
end of May 2010 an austerity measure of €24 billion was enacted. The Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi wanted to reduce the yearly deficit under the convergence criteria of 
3 percent of the GDP per year until 2012. As the European crisis started to deepen 
he still tried to maintain his goal and announced other austerity measures. At the 14th 
of September this new household plan was approved by the Italian parliament. This 
new plan includes a rise of value added tax by 1 percent to 21 percent and a break 
on debts as already implemented in Germany31 with the goal of a balanced 
household by 2013. In spite of trying to cut its deficit the rating agency Standard & 
Poor's (S&P) downgraded Italy from A+ to A with a negative outlook. At the G 20 
summit in October in Cannes, Italy asked the IMF as a confidence building measure 
to send experts to the country to control its efforts in reducing its GDP deficit.  
Due to the difficulty in implementing the new household plan, Italy's prime minister 
had to resign and on the 16th of November 2011. Mario Monti became the new prime 
and also the finance minister of Italy. His cabinet consists of ministers independent of 
any party only. Monti also tries to keep Italy on the road of strict deficit spending and 
getting a balanced household in the year 2014. 
 
 
2.2.3. Portugal 
 
In the year 2008 Portugal had a deficit of 66.3 percent of its GDP. This number 
increased spectacularly during the recession in the following year to 77.5 percent of 
GDP. On the 24th of March the international rating agency Fitch downgraded the long 
term credibility of Portugal stating as a reason that the country has a high level of 
debt and a negative outlook in bettering its situation. The new rating was set at AA-. 
The Portuguese government were outraged that they were already being compared 
with Greece. To prevent the risk of another downgrading, the government decided to 
establish a huge austerity program with the goal of minimizing the record household 
                                               
31 the so called “ Schuldenbremse” 
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deficit of 2010 from 9.3 percent of GDP to around 3 percent in the year 2013. This 
program should increase taxes, while the salaries of employees in the public sector 
should be cut. But the government failed to pass this austerity program and Prime 
Minister José Sócrates resigned from his job. These turbulences in the Portuguese 
government lead to another downgrading of Standard & Poor's to BBB- and of 
Moody's to BAA1 at the end of March / beginning of April 2011.  
On the 20th of May 2011 the IMF granted Portugal an aid package of €26 billion 
demanding that Portugal enforces its effort in getting a balanced budget. But on the 
5th of July the rating agency Moody's downgraded the country again to BA2 level 
which is non-investment grade – speculative. But there are also some stripes on the 
horizon as Portugal will be expected to reach its goal of a 5.9 percent deficit ratio of 
its GDP for the year 2011. The credit rate of its 10 years government bonds declined 
to around 10 percent which marked a new low for the year 2011.  
 
 
2.2.4. Spain 
 
In 2009 Spain's total deficit ratio of its GDP as under the European average at 
around 50 percent. Even in the following year lying at around 66 percent it still was 
around 20 percent under the European average. Spain's problem is the high 
unemployment rate – it has the highest in Europe.  
In the case of Spain the real estate market was running extremely well with a double 
digit growth rate between 1996 and 2006. In 2007 the real estate sector was 
responsible for 18 percent of Spain's GDP – driving the country’s economy. But it 
started to have an excess of supply in the housing market and the housing market 
started to collapse in 2007. 
This slump in the construction sector led to a rapid rise in unemployment. The 
Spanish government tried with economic and social stabilization incentives to buck 
this trend. The now higher public spending and the rise in social benefits caused a 
serious deterioration in the budget situation. In the period 2001-2007 the state deficit 
went down from 56 percent to 37 percent of GDP. Three years later it was over 64 
percent. The situation in Spain got so bad that the European commission announced 
action against its deficit spending in 2009.  
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At the end of January 2010 Madrid announced a very strict austerity package for the 
next three years – saving up to €65 billion.  
 
Reaction of the rating agencies: 
 
Standard & Poor's downgraded Spain's credibility on the 28th of April 2010 from AA+ 
to AA, while Fitch Rating declared that the rating for Spain will remain at the highest 
level of AAA. At the end of May it downgraded Spain to AA+ however, reasoning that 
the drastic austerity measures will in the medium run slow down economic growth.  
On the 30th of September 2010 the rating agency Moody’s decided to not evaluate 
anymore the creditworthiness of Spain with the highest rating AAA, but instead lower 
it to AA1. The rating agency justified its measure because of the declining financial 
strength of the country and the poor economic outlook.  
The situation did not get better in 2011. In March the rating agency Moody’s came to 
the decision to lower again the Spanish rating from AA1 to AA2 and they also did not 
exclude a further downgrading of the highly indebted country. Moody’s justified its 
move with the high financial requirements of the country and the high cost of the 
banking sector reform. 
On the 18th of October 2011 Moody’s lowered again the credit rating of Spain by two 
notches to “A1”. High financial requirements, highly indebted banks and corporations 
and in addition weak economic growth which will hamper the achievement of the 
ambitious savings targets were given as the reasons for the rating agencies to 
downgrade Spain further.  
 
 
2.2.5. Greece 
 
Greece is the only country in the EU that, since the introduction of the Euro, was not 
able to fulfill the Maastricht criteria concerning the public deficit per GDP. Greece’s 
economic problems as well as the extent of their public deficit came to light only 
through the change of government in 2009. In February Greece predicted its deficit to 
be at 3.7 percent, 0.7 percent higher than in the Maastricht treaty. But eight months 
later elections took place and George Papandreou from the PanHellenic Socialist 
Movement became the new prime minister. On the following days the new prime 
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minister revised the state’s deficit and announced that the yearly budget deficit will be 
around 12.7 percent and the public debt will be approximately €410 billion. 
 
In order to understand the reasons of the outbreak of the Greek government-debt 
crisis it is important to not reduce the crisis to a simple debt level problem. The 
misery of Greece’s debt crisis has various issues including lower GDP growth rates 
since 200832, a huge size of shadow economy (with 24.3 percent of GDP in 2008, the 
highest level in Europe) and a big amount of inefficient governmental expenditures. 
All these facts lead to a downgrading of the credibility of Greece by Standard & 
Poor’s. It is clear that this leads to a vicious cycle as the interest rate that the Hellenic 
state has to pay on international markets gets higher and higher. Government debt 
continues to increase and investors are already speculating on a bankruptcy of 
Greece. The consequence for the Euro was that its value started to decrease 
tremendously. 
In early February 2010, the European Commission decided to put the country under 
more pressure, in order to diminish its public deficit. The Hellenic government was 
committed to exhibit regular reports to the European commission about the success 
of the austerity measures. 
After that the Greek prime minister delineated concrete measures about the freezing 
of wages in the public sector and imposed an increase in several taxes. Such cuts in 
the budget were necessary for a country, which has seen its borrowing costs 
escalate in the recent months. 
After the risk spread for government bonds reached a new height, the government 
officially asked for financial aid at the end of April 2010. The EU, the ECB and the 
IMF agreed on the 1st and 2nd of May to support the country with an aid package of 
€110 billion. But this package did not calm the markets for very long – the downswing 
of the Euro continued and the spread for Greek government bonds rose again. Thus 
from the 7th to the 10th of May the European leaders implemented a stabilization 
mechanism to prevent a Euro-zone country bankruptcy.  
Greece tried hard to reduce its deficit. Government expenditure was reduced by 10 
percent but the unemployment rate increased and GDP began to shrink – which 
leads to lower tax revenues. 
                                               
32 Between the year 2000 and 2007 the Greek economy was one oft the fastest growing in the Euro-
Zone with an average rate of 4.2 percent per year. A reason therefore was seen in the falling bond 
yields, which allowed the Greek government to make large structural deficits.  
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In the first half of 2011 protests against austerity measures of the government started 
to grow. The important opposition party Nea Dimokratia (ND) was against most of the 
plan of the government. On the 27th of May the Greek parliament voted against more 
austerity measures.  
A result of this was that the rating agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greece to 
CCC. So the country has since June 2011 the worst rating of all graded countries in 
the world.  
The reaction of the EU was that all parties in Greece should agree to debt reduction 
and if Greece wants to get more financial aid then it should also agree on new 
austerity measures. On the 29th of June the Greek parliament agreed to the new 
austerity package. 
On the 31st of October Prime Minister Papandreou surprisingly announced that he 
would let the Greek population vote on the EU’s emergency aid. Consequentially the 
European governments decided to put pressure on Greece. The Euro-zone finance 
ministers threatened to put on hold the next installment loan. Because of the 
pressure, Prime Minister George Papandreou decided to revoke the referendum and 
six days later he announced his resignation. The former ECB-councilor Lucas 
Papademos was named as new Greek prime minister.   
 
Reaction of the Greeks 
In surveys held shortly before the austerity measurement in May 2010 a majority of 
the population was in favor of it. But as time passed and as the politicians urged for 
new saving packages the mood in the general public started to change. At the 
beginning of 2011 more and more demonstrations were held, also with confrontations 
with the police. Furthermore from January to June 2011 there were four national 
strikes against the austerity measures.  
Since the crisis has started many Greeks have lowered their assets in domestic 
banks and transferred their money abroad or kept it in cash at home. They feared 
that the Greek banks could suffer from insolvency. 
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2.3. Measures against the crisis 
 
What was done or what will be done to surpass this European debt crisis? On the 
one hand every country had its own solution but on the other hand the IMF and the 
European Union tried to help overcome this crisis. We want to take a look at how 
Greece dealt with its problems as it is the core country of the crisis and then we will 
briefly summarize how the other organizations supported the weaker European 
countries. 
 
 
2.3.1. Measures of the Greek government 
 
First austerity package – March/April 2010 
On the 3rd of March 2010 value added tax was raised from 19 to 21 percent and an 
agreement of a cut of the salary of the employees of the public service was reached. 
The yearly savings should have been around €5 billion. Furthermore the so called 
Kallikratis plan was made whereby administrative expenses should be cut and it was 
also planned that the 13th and 14th monthly salary of the civil servants should be 
cancelled permanently.  
 
Second austerity package – May 2010 
On the 2nd of May 2010 the Greek government decided together with the IMF and the 
European Union an austerity package which should save up to €30 billion until 2013. 
The package included:  
 freezing all salaries of civil servants above 2000 euros 
 cancelling of all tax exemptions 
 increasing the retirement age from 61 to 64 
 increasing value added tax from 21 to 23 percent 
 higher tax on tobacco and gas 
The parliament agreed on that enormous package on the 6th of May 2010. 
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Third austerity package – June 2011 
The Greek parliament voted for the third austerity package on the 29th of June 2011 
which would save up to €78 billion. This package was a main condition for another 
credit of €110 billion from the European Union. 
The main points of this package were: 
• increase in property tax and implementing a solidarity tax 
• 150 000 civil servants should be cut 
• investment in the year 2011 should be cut by €700 millions 
• privatization of many state owned companies  
 
 
2.3.2. Measures of the European Union and the IMF 
 
Legal restriction of the European financial help 
The members of the European Union have signed a non–back up clause that there is 
no automatic accountability of the European Union to liabilities of their member states 
(article 125 of the European treaty). This article does not exclude the voluntarily 
taking over of debts of other countries (Bailout). 
  
First austerity package of the EU and the IMF – April 2010 
After the rating agencies downgraded the credit liability of Greece and the risk 
premium for its long term bonds reached a new high, the Greek government officially 
asked on the 23rd of April for international aid.  
The European Union, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund agreed on the 1st and 2nd of May to guarantee a financial aid package of €110 
billion. From that total amount of this aid package the IMF contributed €30 billion and 
the Euro–zone €80 billion. For this help they demanded that the budget of Greece 
should be consolidated within three years meaning that the budget deficit of 2014 
should be dropped under three percent of the GDP.  
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Second austerity package of the EU and the IMF – July 2011 
As the first austerity package was not enough, a new package was agreed during the 
summit of the European Union on the 21st of July.  
The second aid package with a volume of €109 billion was combined under the newly 
created EFSF (more in detail in the next chapter). Parts of this amount can be lent to 
countries that need financial support at a low credit rate of 3.5 percent. Also, for the 
first time the private banking sector should take part in supporting the package on a 
voluntarily basis. This support should reach the sum of €37 billion by the year of 
2014.  
Furthermore a rehabilitation plan for boosting the growth of the economy was 
announced. 
 
 
2.3.3. Measures of the European Central Bank 
 
In May 2010 the European Central Bank bought Greek bonds to the value of €25 
billion to stabilize the price of the country’s bond. The ECB announced that it would 
accept bonds from Greece no matter which rating they have as secure and 
investable. Also in 2011 the Central Bank continued buying Greek bonds. 
 
Critics on the measures of the ECB 
Among European politicians the action of the ECB was not always seen in a positive 
way. One of the hardest critics has been the former German president Christian Wulff 
who said that the legal frame for this action is not provided. 
On the 1st of September 2011 the president of the German Central Bank Jens 
Weidemann gave a widely noticed speech. He said that the sovereign debt crisis was 
the biggest test since the existence of the Euro and he added that the Euro area had 
already taken a great step towards the generalization of the risks of unsound national 
finances. He also pointed out that the enforcement of controlling measures and the 
influence of the national fiscal policy of the member states was missing.  
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2.3.4. EFSF – European Financial Stability Facility 
 
As a result of the escalation of the Greek debt crisis the EU-member states 
(predominantly on a French initiative) decided to develop a temporary stabilization 
mechanism on the 9th of May 2010, with the objective of providing financial 
assistance to Euro-zone states in economic difficulty, which will come into force in 
2013. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is a special purpose entity in 
terms of a stock company based in Luxembourg. The member states of the Euro-
zone are the shareholders, which send one representative per country to the board, 
the management body of the EFSF. Klaus Regeling was appointed as managing 
Director.  
The EFSF, in order to grant credits in a crisis situation, can issue bonds or other debt 
instruments on the capital market, which are guaranteed by the member states. 
Overall it has a lending capacity of 440 billion Euros. In January 2011, in the context 
of the Ireland program, the EFSF placed its first asset to the value of €5 billion with 
an interest rate of 2.89 percent.  
In the case that the debt-ridden countries are not able to repay their loans, the 
member states are liable for the capital to the value of their share in the EFSF, so it 
would amount to 28 percent for Germany for example. In order to get an AAA rating 
and therefore pay the lowest possible interest rate on the issue of debt instruments, 
the EFSF must collateralize them with more than 100 percent by the member states. 
This follows from the fact that not all of the member countries dispose of an AAA 
rating. So in order to obtain the sufficient loan amount of €440 billion, they decided at 
the EU summit of March 2011, to increase the EFSF to a volume of 700 billion Euros. 
The ratification process was delayed to the October of 2011, due to the resistance of 
various member states.  
In addition to the €440 billion of the EFSF, the so called European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) includes €60 billion from the EU budget. Beyond 
that, a further €250 billion appertain to the stabilization mechanism, which the IMF 
can provide in form of standby credits.   
The aim of the EFSF is to grant loans to crisis countries at much lower rates than 
they would receive on their own on the international capital markets. In return, the 
countries that draw advantage from the stability mechanism are forced to arrange 
adjustment programs with the EU and the IMF. These include besides rigorous 
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consolidation of national budgets, the commitment to many economic reforms which 
tend to restrict the growth and the competitiveness of the national economy.    
 
 
2.3.5. ESM – European Stability Mechanism 
 
From the beginning of 2013, the EFSF should be replaced by a permanent stability 
mechanism, the so called European Stability Mechanism (ESM). As distinguished 
from the special purpose entity of the EFSF, the ESM is designed as a fund model. 
The member state will provide the fund with an initial capital of €80 billion. Similar to 
the EFSF, the ESM is conducted by a Government Council, consisting of members of 
each member country. The board of directors, to which each member state will send 
a representative, is responsible for the current transactions. The Government Council 
is in charge for the loans assignment to the crisis countries. The member states are 
committed to provide a guaranteed amount of 620 billion Euros. In addition to the 
financial resources of the ESM, the IMF will continue to provide €250 billion.     
A significant difference when compared to the EFSF is that the ESM is capable of 
buying government bonds, issued by the Member states, in the primary market. 
Therewith it is possible to support bonds which are getting or threatening to get in to 
difficulty on the international capital market. 
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Chapter 3 
3.1. Financial markets in crisis 
 
Firstly what we want to do is provide a brief overview of how the stock markets 
behaved over a longer period before and compare it with the one during the crisis. 
The most important stock indices of our countries of interest are: 
• Austria – ATX 
• France – CAC40 
• Germany – DAX 
• Greece – Athex20 
• Ireland – ISEQ Overall Index 
• Italy – MIB30, FTSE MIB 
• Portugal – PSI-20 
• Spain – IBEX 35 
What we want to show in the following two tables is how the behavior of the stock 
markets in these countries behaved before and during the crisis. In table 3.1 we have 
chosen the horizon from the beginning of 2003 to the end of 2009. On average you 
can see that the stock markets in these countries rose 0.03 percent per day with a 
standard deviation of 1.45 percent and a quite big spread between the minimum and 
the maximum of the highest daily moves. This is because the subprime crisis in 2008 
took its hit on these markets. Nevertheless despite this crisis the mean is still 
positive. For a better understanding of how the mean and the standard deviation 
developed we can also exclude the year 2008, which is what is done in table 3.2.  
The standard deviation declines to a value of 1.17 percent and the mean is in every 
single country positive. When considering the time during the crisis from the start of 
2010 to the end of November 2011 every mean (except Germany as it is seen as a 
secure and healthy economy) is negative. On the top of the list there is Greece with 
an average daily stock market decrease of 0.22 percent. Also the volatility in this 
market is extremely high with a standard deviation of nearly 2.3 percent. But this is 
not only the case with other markets also suffering from higher volatility compared to 
the previous period. So this leads to the conclusion that the stock markets during this 
crisis tend to be highly volatile and investors are reacting strongly to news releases 
regardless in which direction. 
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3.2. Days of market jitters 
 
Over our observation period of nearly 2 years from the beginning of 2010 until the 
end of November of 2011 we found out that the days of market jitters are not just 
appearing on a certain day in one country but also in other countries. Figure 1 
illustrates how many stock indices of our sample countries experienced high swings 
on each day33. This phenomena was also shown in other studies, such as R. Roll 
(1988)34, Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993)35, Gjerde and Saettem (1995)36 and Eun 
and Shim (1989)37. Their conclusions were: 
a) The world market is getting more integrated, especially after the world wide 
shock of October 1987. 
b) The US stock market is the dominant stock market and influences all other 
stock markets, whereas the others have a small or no influence on the US 
stock market. 
c) The European stock markets are integrated to each other and the US stock 
market is influencing these stock markets, but none of them is significantly 
influencing the US stock market. 
 
In terms of our study we can say that volatility started to increase at the end of April 
respectively beginning of May 2010. This was the time when the rating agencies 
started to downgrade Greece to junk status and the European Union and IMF 
unveiled their help package to stop the sovereign debt crisis. After that markets 
calmed down and started to peak out again at the middle of October 2011 when the 
United States got downgraded, future prospects of recession arose and some 
governments in Europe started to tumble.  
 
Looking at each country separately with the starting point of the stocks prices at the 
1st of January 2010 you can see when in each country the market turbulences started 
                                               
33 Also at appendix A we included a table where you can compare the percentage changes of the 
other countries at a day of a top 20 market jitters.  
34 Roll R., (1988). The international crash of October 1987. Financial Analyst Journal, Vol. 44, pp.19-35 
35 Arshanapalli B., J. Doukas, (1993). International stock market linkages: Evidence from the pre- and 
post- October 1987 period, Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 17, pp. 193-208 
36 Gjerde O., Saettem F., (1995). Linkages among European and world stock markets, The European 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 1, pp. 165-179 
37 Eun S., Shim S., (1989). International transmission of stock market movements, Journal of 
International Financial Management, Vol. 8, pp. 89-101 
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to occur. In each of the following figures from 3.2 to 3.9 the 1st of January 2010 has 
the value 100 and the triangles symbolize the days of market rallies while the circles 
stand for days of market downturns.  
For Austria, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain you can say that their reactions during 
the crisis are similar to the average of all the countries. But for Germany in figure 4 
you see that there is only one negative market jitter in the year 2010. In the middle of 
2011 the stock market in Germany started to increase its volatility. Germany’s 
economy was quite stable but as the debt crisis deepened the fear that it would it 
would also reach Germany made the DAX swing. In the case of Greece in figure 3.5 
we can say that the stock index experienced turbulence throughout the considered 
time horizon. The situation in Ireland was quite different. A large number of the top 20 
swings of its stock exchange are already in the second quarter of 2010. This is 
because the banking sector in Ireland had huge problems at that time38. So the big 
swings for Ireland began earlier than in the other countries.  
                                               
38 A National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was founded as a Bad Bank (=private banks are 
allowed to take risky assets off their books to the Bad Bank) and took over liabilities worth €81 
billion of the following banks: Allied Irish Banks, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, Irish Nationwide 
Building Society and EBS Building Society. 
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Stock Market Indices and Days of Stock Market Jitters  
 
Figure 3.2: Austria 
 
 
Figure 3.3: France 
 
 
Notes: January 1, 2010 = 100 
 Triangles: Days of Positive Market Jitters Circles: Days of Negative Market Jitters 
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Figure 3.4: Germany 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Greece 
 
 
Notes: January 1, 2010 = 100 
 Triangles: Days of Positive Market Jitters Circles: Days of Negative Market Jitters 
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Figure 3.6: Ireland 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Italy 
 
 
Notes: January 1, 2010 = 100 
 Triangles: Days of Positive Market Jitters Circles: Days of Negative Market Jitters 
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Figure 3.8: Portugal 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Spain 
 
 
Notes: January 1, 2010 = 100 
 Triangles: Days of Positive Market Jitters Circles: Days of Negative Market Jitters 
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3.3. Declaring news and dummy variables 
 
It is somehow clear that news influences an investor's decision in buying or selling 
financial goods. What we are going to do is to take a closer look at how the nature of 
a news update influences stock movements. Therefore we picked the same countries 
and their stock indices as in the last section and perform a few technical analyses. 
The source for our information of the news is mainly Bloomberg with the exception of 
the smaller countries like Austria and Ireland as they are not included in the archive 
of Bloomberg. For these countries we use local newspapers of these countries like 
the Presse and the Irish Times. We further cross-checked all our news with that of 
other financial agencies like the Financial Times, sole24hore, reuters.com, CNN, 
wallstreetjournal, marketWatch, etc. and found that these sources report similar data 
to Bloomberg. 
Our next step was to create our dataset with the top 20 largest swings of the indices 
of our eight chosen countries dividing it into the following columns (see chapter 4.1 
table: 4.1). Firstly there is the date when the event of a market turbulence happened; 
next we stated the country whose index was affected by a large swing and the 
percentage change of the index on this certain day: then there is our main column of 
the news texts that were released on that specific day. Subsequently we looked 
where these news items had their origin from and classified the news into certain 
categories. It shows that it is also possible that news can originate in more than one 
country and that it is not just limited to the countries of our sample. You can see that 
business related information from the United States, China etc. also affected the 
European stock market. We have also added the European Union as a source of 
origin of news as this heavily influences monetary policy and international 
agreements. Similarly, for a given country of origin there can also be news from more 
than one sector on any given day. We have divided the data it into six groups: 
 economic news (EN): consisting of financial, real or external sector news 
 political news (PN): that means political decisions, political speeches, political 
events, elections or political talk 
 international agreement (IA): including agreements from the European Union, 
the EFSF, international organizations or financial community 
 monetary policy (MP): release of information of an expansionary or 
contractionary monetary policy 
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 credit ratings (CR): ratings by international agencies like Moody's, Standard & 
Poor's, and Fitch. 
 no news (NN): if on that they there was no relevant news released 
 
The last column contains our press information transformed into a dummy variable. 
The value of these dummies can either 1, -1 for the sector stated in the previous 
column. For our regression later on these dummies also take the value zero if on a 
certain day there is no specific news available for that particular type of sector. On 
the data sheet of the next pages we excluded all zero values for a better overview. 
When do these dummy variables take the value 1, -1 or zero? 
 
EN:  +1: the news suggest a better outlook for financial, real or external sectors of the 
 economy 
 –1: the news suggest a worse outlook for financial, real or external sectors of 
the economy 
   0: otherwise 
 
PN:  +1: if there is an political event that creates political stability 
 –1: if there is an political event that creates political uncertainty 
   0: otherwise 
 
IA: +1: when an international agreement that affects the country in a positive way is 
 signed or a positive international agreement becomes closer to be accepted  
 –1:  when an international agreement that affects the country in a negative way 
is signed or a positive international agreement moves away to be accepted 
   0: otherwise 
 
MP: +1: release of information of an expansionary monetary policy 
 –1: release of information of a contractionary monetary policy 
   0: otherwise 
 
CR: +1: if a rating agency upgrades or has a positive outlook for the country 
 –1: if a rating agency downgrades or has a negative outlook for the country 
   0: otherwise 
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NN:  +1: if there are not any relevant news or just rumors 
  0: otherwise 
 
The dummy variable describes whether investors are making their decisions based 
on rumors or their individual belief but not on any fundamental data. Mostly in our 
date on days with no news the media is expressing their concern about a bad 
economic situation where else no economic news can be found on those days. So 
we can say that on those no news days the swings on the stock markets are caused 
by herding behavior with no profound background data supporting it. 
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Chapter 4
4.1. News
Table 4.1: Daily Returns (in per cent) and News in Days of Market Jitters
Date Ctry. Change News Origin from type value
12.01.10 Gre -5,0 
The European Commission has published a 
damning report on Greece's "unreliable" 
economic figures, increasing the chances of 
the EU executive launching infringement 
proceedings against Athens. The EU nations 
have asked the commission to propose 
appropriate measures to be taken to address 
the situation.
Gre PN -1
04.02.10 Spain -5,9 Spanish Treasury sold bonds at higher interest rate than expected. Spain MP -1
04.02.10 Por -5,0 Portuguese bond auction fails and the spread rose. Por MP -1
09.02.10 Gre 5,0 
First austerity package. The package was 
implemented on 9 February 2010 and included 
a freeze in the salaries of all government 
employees, a 10% cut in bonuses, as well as 
cuts in overtime workers, public employees 
and work-related travels.
Gre IA 1
09.02.10 Gre 5,0 
The austerity package was implemented on 9 
February 2010 and included a freeze in the 
salaries of all government employees, a 10% 
cut in bonuses, as well as cuts in overtime 
workers, public employees and work-related 
travels.
Gre FP 1
26.04.10 Por -3,2 Germany unwilling to help Greece out unconditionally. Ger IA -1
27.04.10 Gre -6,0 S&P downgrades Greek debt to junk status. Gre CR -1
27.04.10 France -3,8 S&P Cuts Portugal and Greece Ratings. Por/Gre CR -1
27.04.10 Spain -4,2 S&P Cuts Portugal and Greece Ratings. Por/Gre CR -1
27.04.10 Por -5,4 
S&P lowered the investment grade status of 
Portugal, citing the weak "macroeconomic 
structures".
Por CR -1
27.04.10 Ire -4,5 S&P Cuts Portugal and Greece Ratings. Por/Gre CR -1
29.04.10 Gre 7,1 EU Nears Agreement on Aid Package. Gre IA 1
29.04.10 Por 4,6 EU Nears Agreement on Aid Package. Gre IA 1
29.04.10 Ire 3,5 EU Nears Agreement on Aid Package. Gre IA 1
04.05.10 Italy -4,7 
Concerns that the rescue package for Greece 
will need to be extended to Spain and 
Portugal.
Por/Spain NN 1
04.05.10 Gre -6,7 
Prime Minister George Papandreou 
announced a new round of austerity measures.  
The bill was submitted to Parliament on 4 May 
which led to massive demonstrations.
Gre FP -1
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Date Ctry. Change News Origin from type value
04.05.10 Spain -5,4 
Concerns that the rescue package for Greece 
will need to be extended to Spain and 
Portugal.
Por/Spain NN 1
04.05.10 Por -4,2 
Concerns that the rescue package for Greece 
will need to be extended to Spain and 
Portugal.
Por/Spain NN 1
04.05.10 Aut -4,0 
Concerns that the rescue package for Greece 
will need to be extended to Spain and 
Portugal.
Por/Spain NN 1
04.05.10 Ire -4,2 
Concerns that the rescue package for Greece 
will need to be extended to Spain and 
Portugal.
Por/Spain NN 1
06.05.10 Italy -4,3 Italy’s government cuts its economic growth forecasts for the year 2010 and 2011. Italy EN -1
06.05.10 Italy -4,3 
Banking systems in Greece, Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland and the U.K. may come under 
pressure as the crisis worsens (Moody’s said 
in a report).
Italy CR -1
07.05.10 France -4,6 
Debt crisis in Greece will spread. Credit 
Agricole SA, France’s biggest bank by 
branches has 2.4 billion euros of commercial 
commitments in Greece.
Gre NN 1
07.05.10 Ire -4,1 No News. Ire NN 1
10.05.10 Italy 11,3 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 Italy 11,3 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Gre 9,1 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 Gre 9,1 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 France 9,7 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 France 9,7 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Ger 5,3 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 Ger 5,3 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Spain 14,4 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
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Date Ctry. Change News Origin from type value
10.05.10 Spain 14,4 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Por 10,7 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 Por 10,7 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Aut 9,1 
European policy makers unveiled an 
unprecedented loan package worth almost $1 
trillion and a program of bond purchases to 
stop a sovereign-debt crisis.
EU IA 1
10.05.10 Aut 9,1 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
10.05.10 Ire 7,9 Bank of Ireland Cuts Rights Issue After $1.1 Billion Debt-for-Equity Swap. Ire EN 1
10.05.10 Ire 7,9 Central banks buy government bonds of euro countries. EU MP 1
14.05.10 Italy -5,3 Concerns that the fiscal debt crisis in southern Europe will persist. EU NN 1
14.05.10 France -4,6 Concern that the Euro’s debt crisis will hamper economic growth. EU NN 1
14.05.10 Spain -6,6 Concern that the Euro’s debt crisis will hamper economic growth. EU NN 1
14.05.10 Por -4,3 Concern that the Euro’s debt crisis will hamper economic growth. EU NN 1
14.05.10 Ire -4,3 Concern that the Euro’s debt crisis will hamper economic growth. EU NN 1
19.05.10 Ire -4,2 No News. Ire NN 1
25.05.10 Aut -4,4 IWF criticise Spain as a consequence of the default of the Bank Cajasur Spain IA -1
25.05.10 Ire -3,8 
The Irish maker of Magners Cider reported an 
8.1 percent drop in annual profit and said it 
remains “cautious” about the Irish and U.K. 
economies.
Ire EN -1
26.05.10 Por 3,2 Billionaire Carlos Slim is studying the purchase of a stake in the Portugal Telecom SGPS SA. Por EN 1
26.05.10 Ire 3,7 No News. Ire NN 1
27.05.10 Italy 4,5 China said it will continue to invest in Europe amid the region’s debt crisis. China PN 1
27.05.10 Por 3,6 China said it will continue to invest in Europe amid the region’s debt crisis. China PN 1
27.05.10 Ire 3,9 China said it will continue to invest in Europe amid the region’s debt crisis. China PN 1
04.06.10 Gre -5,0 Concerns about Hungarian economical situation. Hungary EN -1
04.06.10 Aut -4,1 Concerns about Hungarian economical situation. Hungary EN -1
07.06.10 Gre -5,5 European Debt Concerns . EU NN 1
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11.06.10 Spain 4,0 
European Union said Spain is implementing 
the “necessary measures” to rein in its budget 
deficit.
Spain PN 1
29.06.10 Italy -4,4 Concern over weakening growth in China. China EN -1
29.06.10 Italy -4,4 Slump in U.S. consumer confidence. USA EN -1
29.06.10 France -4,0 Concern over weakening growth in China. China EN -1
29.06.10 France -4,0 Slump in U.S. consumer confidence. USA EN -1
29.06.10 Spain -5,5 Concern over weakening growth in China. China EN -1
29.06.10 Spain -5,5 Slump in U.S. consumer confidence. USA EN -1
29.06.10 Ire -3,8 Concern over weakening growth in China. China EN -1
29.06.10 Ire -3,8 Slump in U.S. consumer confidence. USA EN -1
24.08.10 Ire -5,8 Standard & Poor's Ratings Services trims its rating on Ireland by one notch. Ire CR -1
01.09.10 France 3,8 
Better-than-estimated growth in American and 
Chinese manufacturing bolstered confidence in 
the global economic recovery.
USA/China EN 1
01.12.10 Spain 4,4 China commits to European Investment. USA EN 1
01.12.10 Aut 3,7 Austrian unemployment rate sinks 5.2% Aut EN 1
01.12.10 Aut 3,7 USA commits to European Investment. USA EN 1
12.01.11 Gre 5,0 Europe puts effort to Resolve Debt Crisis. EU NN 1
12.01.11 Spain 5,4 Portugal completes Bond Sale. Por MP 1
14.03.11 Gre 5,2 EU Leaders Expand Bailout Plan. EU IA 1
31.05.11 Gre 5,6 Greece Will Probably Get EU Aid to Avoid Default (Fitch Ratings). Gre CR 1
30.06.11 Por 3,0 
Greek lawmakers approved a bill authorizing 
austerity measures, qualifying the country for 
further aid.
Gre FP 1
06.07.11 Por -3,0 Moody’s Investors Service cut Portugal’s credit rating to junk status. Por CR -1
11.07.11 Por -4,3 
The country’s central bank said that Portugal’s 
economy will shrink more than forecasted this 
year and will contract in 2012.
Por EN -1
22.07.11 Gre 5,9 EU Agrees on Second Bailout Plan for Greece. Gre IA 1
22.07.11 Ger 3,7 
Euro-area leaders announced a new aid 
package for Greece and measures to protect 
Spain and Italy from higher bond yields.
EU IA 1
04.08.11 Italy -5,2 
The European Central Bank resumed bond 
purchases and offered banks more cash to 
stem the spread of the debt crisis.
EU MP 1
04.08.11 Italy -5,2 Concerns that the global economy may relapse into a recession. USA EN -1
04.08.11 France -3,9 
The European Central Bank resumed bond 
purchases and offered banks more cash to 
stem the spread of the debt crisis.
EU MP 1
04.08.11 France -3,9 Concerns that the global economy may relapse into a recession. USA EN -1
04.08.11 Ger -3,4 
The European Central Bank resumed bond 
purchases and offered banks more cash to 
stem the spread of the debt crisis.
EU MP 1
04.08.11 Ger -3,4 Concerns that the global economy may relapse into a recession. USA EN -1
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04.08.11 Por -3,3 
The European Central Bank resumed bond 
purchases and offered banks more cash to 
stem the spread of the debt crisis.
EU MP 1
04.08.11 Por -3,3 Concerns that the global economy may relapse into a recession. USA EN -1
04.08.11 Ire -3,5 
The European Central Bank resumed bond 
purchases and offered banks more cash to 
stem the spread of the debt crisis.
EU MP 1
04.08.11 Ire -3,5 Ireland’s unemployment rate rose to the highest in six months in July. Ire EN -1
08.08.11 Gre -6,0 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
08.08.11 France -4,7 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
08.08.11 Ger -5,0 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
08.08.11 Por -3,1 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
08.08.11 Aut -6,1 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
08.08.11 Ire -4,4 U.S. Loses AAA Credit Rating as S&P Slams Debt Levels. USA CR -1
10.08.11 Italy -6,6 Cost to insure French government debt against default climbed to a record. France EN -1
10.08.11 France -5,5 Cost to insure French government debt against default climbed to a record. France EN -1
10.08.11 Ger -5,1 Cost to insure French government debt against default climbed to a record. France EN -1
10.08.11 Spain -5,5 Cost to insure French government debt against default climbed to a record. France EN -1
11.08.11 Italy 4,1 
Investors speculated that recent losses have 
overestimated the slowdown in the pace of 
economic growth. 
EU NN 1
12.08.11 France 4,0 France, Spain, Italy and Belgium imposed short-selling bans.
France/ 
Spain/Italy MP 1
12.08.11 Ger 3,5 France, Spain, Italy and Belgium imposed short-selling bans.
France/ 
Spain/Italy MP 1
12.08.11 Spain 4,8 France, Spain, Italy and Belgium imposed short-selling bans.
France/ 
Spain/Italy MP 1
12.08.11 Aut 3,8 France, Spain, Italy and Belgium imposed short-selling bans.
France/ 
Spain/Italy MP 1
18.08.11 Italy -6,1 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
18.08.11 France -5,5 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
18.08.11 Ger -5,8 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
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18.08.11 Spain -4,7 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
18.08.11 Por -4,1 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
18.08.11 Aut -5,2 
Fears about a sharp slowdown in global 
economic growth and worries over the health 
of the European banking sector.
EU NN 1
18.08.11 Ire -4,3 
The Irish government must change the way it 
handles the public finances and accept greater 
EU surveillance of its policies.
Ire NN 1
29.08.11 Gre 14,4 EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA (EUROB) and Alpha Bank SA announced a merger. Gre EN 1
30.08.11 Gre -4,8 
National Bank of Greece SA (ETE), the 
country’s biggest bank, reported a first-half 
loss after writing down its holdings of Greek 
government bonds.
Gre EN -1
31.08.11 Ire 3,7 
Irish and Portuguese securities rose as 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Cabinet 
approved proposed changes to the European 
Financial Stability Facility.
Ger IA 1
02.09.11 Ger -3,4 European Stocks Sink as Report Shows U.S. Jobs Growth Stagnates. USA EN -1
05.09.11 Italy -4,8 
Merkel lost an important election - The 
German Chancellor failed to sway voters in her 
home state with a campaign based on her 
handling of the euro area’s debt crisis.
Ger PN -1
05.09.11 France -4,7 
Merkel lost an important election - The 
German Chancellor failed to sway voters in her 
home state with a campaign based on her 
handling of the euro area’s debt crisis.
Ger PN -1
05.09.11 Ger -5,3 
Merkel lost an important election - The 
German Chancellor failed to sway voters in her 
home state with a campaign based on her 
handling of the euro area’s debt crisis.
Ger PN -1
05.09.11 Spain -4,7 
Merkel lost an important election - The 
German Chancellor failed to sway voters in her 
home state with a campaign based on her 
handling of the euro area’s debt crisis.
Ger PN -1
07.09.11 Italy 4,2 Silvio Berlusconi won a confidence vote on austerity measures. Italy PN 1
07.09.11 Gre 8,0 
Germany’s top court rejected challenges to the 
participation of Europe’s largest economy in 
the Euro rescue funds.
Ger EN 1
07.09.11 Gre 8,0 Silvio Berlusconi won a confidence vote on austerity measures. Italy PN 1
07.09.11 Ger 4,1 
Germany’s top court rejected challenges to the 
participation of Europe’s largest economy in 
euro rescue funds.
Ger EN 1
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07.09.11 Ger 4,1 Silvio Berlusconi won a confidence vote on austerity measures. Italy PN 1
09.09.11 Italy -4,9 
European Central Bank said that Executive 
Board member Juergen Stark has resigned for 
“personal reasons.” Stark will keep his post 
until the central bank appoints his successor.
EU NN 1
09.09.11 Ger -4,0 
European Central Bank said that Executive 
Board member Juergen Stark has resigned for 
“personal reasons.” Stark will keep his post 
until the central bank appoints his successor.
EU NN 1
09.09.11 Spain -4,4 
European Central Bank said that Executive 
Board member Juergen Stark has resigned for 
“personal reasons.” Stark will keep his post 
until the central bank appoints his successor.
EU NN 1
09.09.11 Aut -5,4 
European Central Bank said that Executive 
Board member Juergen Stark has resigned for 
“personal reasons.” Stark will keep his post 
until the central bank appoints his successor.
EU NN 1
12.09.11 France -4,0 
Moody’s said to cut the french bank’s ratings 
(BNP Paribas (BNP) SA, Societe Generale SA 
and Credit Agricole SA) because of their Greek 
holdings.
France CR -1
12.09.11 France -4,0 Speculation mounted that Germany is preparing for Greece to default. Gre EN -1
12.09.11 Por -4,2 Speculation mounted that Germany is preparing for Greece to default. Gre EN -1
12.09.11 Aut -3,8 Speculation mounted that Germany is preparing for Greece to default. Gre EN -1
14.09.11 Ger 3,4 Germany, France Confirm Support for Greece. Ger/France IA 1
15.09.11 Por 3,1 
European Central Bank announced 
coordinated measures with the Federal 
Reserve to ensure banks have enough dollars.
EU MP 1
22.09.11 Italy -4,5 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
22.09.11 Italy -4,5 European Central Bank Said to Be Buying Spanish, Italian Bonds. Italy MP 1
22.09.11 France -5,3 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
22.09.11 Ger -5,0 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
22.09.11 Spain -4,6 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
22.09.11 Spain -4,6 European Central Bank Said to Be Buying Spanish, Italian Bonds. Spain MP 1
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22.09.11 Por -5,2 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
22.09.11 Aut -6,1 Federal Reserve signaled “significant downside risks” to the world’s largest economy. USA EN -1
27.09.11 Italy 4,9 Germany vowed continued support for Greece. Ger PN 1
27.09.11 France 5,7 Germany vowed continued support for Greece. Ger PN 1
27.09.11 Ger 5,3 Germany vowed continued support for Greece. Ger PN 1
27.09.11 Spain 4,0 Germany vowed continued support for Greece. Ger PN 1
27.09.11 Aut 5,7 Germany vowed continued support for Greece. Ger PN 1
04.10.11 Gre -6,3 
The Eurogroup has again postponed the 
disbursement of a sixth tranche of aid to 
Greece.
Gre IA -1
05.10.11 France 4,3 Moody’s Downgrades Italy. Italy CR -1
05.10.11 France 4,3 Postitive US economic data. USA EN 1
05.10.11 Ger 4,9 Postitive US economic data. USA EN 1
05.10.11 Aut 5,7 Postitive US economic data. USA EN 1
12.10.11 Aut 4,2 The Slovakian goverment agreed to enlarge the EFSF. Slovakia IA 1
21.10.11 Gre 5,3 Euro-Area Finance Chiefs Approve Sixth Aid Payment to Greece. Gre IA 1
21.10.11 Ger 3,5 Euro-Area Finance Chiefs Approve Sixth Aid Payment to Greece. Gre IA 1
27.10.11 Italy 5,5 Region’s leaders agreed to expand a bailout fund to halt the sovereign debt crisis. EU IA 1
27.10.11 Gre 4,8 
Eurozone leaders and the IMF came to an 
agreement with banks to accept a 50% write-
off of (some part of) Greek's debt.
EU IA 1
27.10.11 France 6,3 Agreement of European Bank's with the European Union on their recapitalization. EU IA 1
27.10.11 Ger 5,3 Agreement of European Bank's with the European Union on their recapitalization. EU IA 1
27.10.11 Spain 5,0 Agreement of European Bank's with the European Union on their recapitalization. EU IA 1
27.10.11 Aut 5,8 Agreement of European Bank's with the European Union on their recapitalization. EU IA 1
27.10.11 Ire 3,8 Agreement of European Bank's with the European Union on their recapitalization. EU IA 1
31.10.11 Aut -3,9 
Austria's Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB) said it 
will come up by Christmas with a plan to close 
the capital gap flagged by European banking 
regulators.
Aut MP -1
01.11.11 Italy -6,8 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
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Date Ctry. Change News Origin from type value
01.11.11 Gre -6,9 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
01.11.11 France -5,4 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
01.11.11 Ger -5,0 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
01.11.11 Spain -4,2 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
01.11.11 Por -3,7 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
01.11.11 Ire -4,3 European stocks decline on Greek Referendum. Gre PN -1
21.11.11 Italy -4,7 
U.S. lawmakers may fail to reach an 
agreement on budget cuts, raising the 
prospect the world’s largest economy could 
face another credit downgrade.
USA PN -1
21.11.11 Aut -4,8 
U.S. lawmakers may fail to reach an 
agreement on budget cuts, raising the 
prospect the world’s largest economy could 
face another credit downgrade.
USA PN -1
28.11.11 Italy 4,6 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
28.11.11 Italy 4,6 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 France 5,5 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
28.11.11 France 5,5 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 Ger 4,6 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
28.11.11 Ger 4,6 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 Spain 4,6 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
28.11.11 Spain 4,6 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 Aut 5,0 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
28.11.11 Aut 5,0 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 Ire 3,6 Europe’s rescue fund may insure as much as 30 percent of sovereign bonds. EU EN 1
28.11.11 Ire 3,6 EU leaders draft framework for Bailout Fund. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Aut 3,8 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 Aut 3,8 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 France 4,2 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 France 4,2 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Ger 5,0 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 Ger 5,0 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Italy 4,4 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 Italy 4,4 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Spain 4,0 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
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Date Ctry. Change News Origin from type value
30.11.11 Spain 4,0 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Por 3,2 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 Por 3,2 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
30.11.11 Ire 4,8 China cut its reserve ratio for banks. China MP 1
30.11.11 Ire 4,8 The euro countries have made the turnout for the leverage of the euro rescue fund EFSF. EU IA 1
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4.2. Analysis: sector of origin 
 
 
Table 4.2: Origins of Market Turbulences: Sector of Origin 
       
Market 
Jitters in: 
Number of news items of type: 
Economic 
News 
Political 
News 
International 
Agreement 
Monetary 
Policy 
Credit 
Ratings 
No 
News 
       Austria 7 3 6 4 1 3 
France 9 3 4 4 3 3 
Germany 7 4 7 4 1 2 
Greece 6 3 8 1 3 2 
Ireland 6 2 5 3 3 6 
Italy 7 6 4 4 1 5 
Portugal 5 3 4 5 3 3 
Spain 6 4 4 6 1 4 
  
      Total 53 28 42 31 16 28 
 
 
Altogether we have collected 198 different pieces of news. Nearly half of all the news 
is attached to the economic type of news or international agreements. It is more or 
less intuitive that economic news plays an important role for the stock markets, 
especially during a crisis – as the markets are already filled with tension. During such 
a period investors are always seeking for profound economic data to determine their 
next decisions. Since we are living in a more and more globalized society and 
particularly the states of the European Union are connected even closer together 
international agreements (mostly from the European Union itself) also fill out a great 
amount of the news. Above all there is Greece – the origin country of the crisis – 
where these international agreements are very important as they are dependent on 
help from the European Union – which support the Hellenic country with financial aid 
and also try to condemn the country's budget deficit. As you can see in table 4.2 the 
second largest number among the news concerning international agreements 
belongs to Germany as it is the country that contributes the most amount of money to 
the security funds of the European Union.  
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Looking at the political news you will find Italy in the leading position with 6 news 
releases – this is due of the turbulence of the government of Berlusconi which lead to 
a lot of insecurity in the Italian stock exchange. There were lots of confidence votes 
during the mid of 2011 where the result for the reigning prime minister was not so 
clear. 
Taking a closer look at monetary policy news you will find Portugal and Spain on the 
top of the list. This is because the governments of the Iberian Peninsula tried to lower 
the spread of their bonds with several legal acts. More than a third of all the monetary 
policy news belongs to these two countries. 
One might find it also interesting that the sector of the news concerning rating 
agencies is taking the last place of all the groups of news as the media is always 
referring to for example downgradings of a certain country. But the fact is that only 
the first rating agency that performs such a downgrade has an impact on the stock 
exchange market. If the other rating agencies perform a downgrade later it is already 
priced in the market.  
 
 
4.3. Analysis: country of origin 
 
In table 4.3 we sorted the news by country of origin. At first sight looking at our 
sample of countries we can see that Greece is by far the country where most of the 
news originated from. Clearly it is like that because if one is talking about the 
European debt crisis these days, Greece is the country which you are thinking in the 
first place speaking about this topic. It is where the crisis has started and the country 
with the most financial troubles.  
The nature of the European Union – connecting all economies of the member states 
closer together – makes the number of news originated in the European Union with 
nearly a third of all the news the highest in general. If something is agreed in one of 
the boards of the Union, investors tend to react accordingly to that news as it can 
guarantee aid and help or restrict a nation’s freedom of action. Another huge amount 
of news belongs to the two strongest economic powers in the world, the United 
States and China (29 and 15 news items). Especially in the US the European debt 
crisis was seen with fear and heavily criticized by its government as they feared a 
new global recession coming up again affecting America itself too. 
50
 
 
News from the smaller countries like Austria or Ireland tended to play a role in the 
country itself but did not have a large impact on other countries. Usually the economy 
of smaller countries is strongly connected to neighbor countries as with Austria, 
whose economy is heavily linked with the German and Italian one. 
Broadly speaking, for most of the countries foreign news matter the most (the 
exception is Greece). The reason for that is that the stock traders took a closer look 
over their boarders as it was the fear that not only Greece could collapse but also the 
other weaker states in the European Union like Spain, Italy or Portugal. So a lot of 
attention was paid to announcements regarding these countries.  
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Chapter 5 
5.1. Econometric method  
 
The following part of our thesis estimates the effect of the different news types on the 
stock markets of our eight sample countries. In our analysis we also obtain results 
when there is no news, i.e. there are moves just because of investors’ concerns 
irrespective of the release of any information. In our regression analysis the variable 
capturing this is called no news. It can be interpreted as so-called herding behavior. 
You should also keep in mind that herding behavior can be found if investors over- or 
underreact to fundamental news. This special type of herding behavior is not the 
concern of our work.  
 
In our first regression we want to examine whether news releases from different 
sectors of the economy lead to different impacts on the stock markets. We run 
regressions of price changes on the dummy variables – which account for each piece 
of new information. Our regression looks like: 
 
(Regression I)   𝑅𝑡
𝑗 =� 𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑗  
 
t = the day of the news release 
i = our six previously defined sectors; (e.g. i = 6: sector of no news) 
n = amount of our dummy variables, n = 6 
R = the percentage change of the stock market index in country j from the market 
closing in t – 1 to the market closing in t 
D = dummy variable related to sector i; (e.g. D1 = the political news dummy) 
αi = coefficients which show the effect of news releases of the different sectors on the 
stocks market 
ε = standard error 
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All the results (table 5.1 – first column) we obtain are significantly different from zero. 
Our total number of observations is 160 and the R-squared lies near to the value of 
139. 
 
In our second regression we want to see if the different types of news show any 
difference if their nature is bad or good. To run our regression, we separate every 
dummy variable accordingly to a good and a bad one. For example the dummy 
variable pn for political news is divided into pn_good (if news generated political 
stability) and pn_bad (if the opposite case occurs). All the other new dummies are 
created similarly. We run the following regression: 
 
(Regression II)   𝑅𝑡
𝑗 =� 𝛼𝑖´𝐷𝑡𝑖´𝑛´𝑖´=1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑗 
 
 
i´ = our eleven previously defined good and bad sectors; (e.g. i = 1: sector of good 
political news) 
n´ = amount of our dummy variables, n´ = 11 
D = dummy variable related to sector i´; (e.g. D1 = the good political news dummy) 
αi´ = coefficients which show the effect of news releases of the different sectors on 
the stocks market 
 
The results are shown in table 5.1 – second column. As in the previous regression all 
coefficients from the dummy variables are significantly different from zero and also 
the R-squared is near the value of one. 
For all good news the coefficient is positive respectively negative for bad news. So in 
general after a good (bad) news is released the reaction of the stocks market is 
usually positive (negative).  
 
In our next regression we want to see if the origin of the news does matter. The 
process of creating our new dummy variables for this regression is quite similar to the 
good and bad news variables but in this case we are dividing our general dummies 
into foreign and domestic dummies. As an example we take the political news 
                                               
39 For a more detailed analysis of the coefficients see the next sections 
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dummy and implement two new dummies looking if the news release is from foreign 
(pn_foreign) or domestic (pn_domestic) origin. The regression that we are running 
looks like this: 
 
(Regression III)   𝑅𝑡
𝑗 =� 𝛼𝑖´´𝐷𝑡𝑖´´𝑛´´𝑖´´=1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑗  
 
 
i´´ = our twelve previously defined foreign and domestic sectors; (e.g. i´´ = 1: sector of 
domestic political news) 
n´´ = amount of our dummy variables, n´´ = 12 
D = dummy variable related to sector i´´; (e.g. D1 = the domestic political news 
dummy) 
αi´´ = coefficients which show the effect of news releases of the different sectors on 
the stocks market 
 
Our results are shown at table 5.1 – third column. The R–squared is again around 0.8 
and all coefficients are significantly different from zero.40  
 
In the final regression we separated the origin of the news into crisis- and non–crisis 
countries. As crisis countries we used the so called PIIGS, which are Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. The procedure is likewise to the foreign and 
domestic problem of regression III but this time we separate it into PIIGS countries 
and non PIIGS countries. The regression looks as follows: 
 
 
(Regression IV)   𝑅𝑡
𝑗 =� 𝛼𝑖´´´𝐷𝑡𝑖´´´𝑛´´´𝑖´´´=1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑗  
 
 
i´´´ = our twelve previously defined PIIGS and non PIIGS sectors; (e.g. i´´ = 1: sector 
of PIIGS political news) 
n´´´ = amount of our dummy variables, n´´´ = 12 
                                               
40 For a more detailed analysis of the coefficients see the next sections 
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D = dummy variable related to sector i´´´; (e.g. D1 = the PIIGS political news dummy) 
αi´´´ = coefficients which show the effect of news releases of the different sectors on 
the stocks market 
 
The results that we are getting are shown in the last column of table 5.1. All 
coefficients are significantly different from zero and the R-squared again lies around 
0.8.  
 
Furthermore for a detailed look if the coefficients are significantly different to each 
other take a look at appendix B – there will you find all the exact data for it.  
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OLS
Regression I
Constant -0,35
(-1,47)
4,52 *** 2,73 *** -6,57 *** 5,11 *** 4,39 *** 4,17 *** 4,34 ***
(20,34) (2,61) (-6,24) (16,21) (19,29) (9,66) (26,63)
4,12 *** 2,29 *** -6,13 *** 2,84 *** 4,48 *** 3,81 *** 4,42 ***
(10,09) (2,89) (-5,41) (3,13) (7,23) (3,10) (11,91)
2,94 *** 2,17 *** -4,67 *** 3,70 *** 1,59 *** 2,35 *** 2,78 ***
(5,66) (3,31) (-2,25) (5,81) (1,99) (2,85) (4,32)
4,16 *** 2,81 *** -6,19 *** 4,67 *** 4,06 *** 4,92 *** 4,35 ***
(9,68) (2,95) (-4,83) (8,19) (13,32) (8,10) (9,47)
3,93 *** 3,98 *** -5,47 *** 3,01 *** 4,18 *** 3,92 *** 3,74 ***
(7,62) (3,88) (-4,03) (2,99) (9,38) (6,28) (4,97)
No News -3,79 *** -3,63 *** -3,91 *** -2,61 *** -3,51 ***
(-6,94) (-5,43) (-11,30) (-2,84) (-4,49)
R-Squared 0,825
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively.
           T-statistics in parentheses
Percent Change 
in Stock Market 
Prices
0,8010,837 0,805
-5,74 ***
(-5,02)
160 160 160
Table 5.1: Regression Analysis
Regression II Regression III Regression IV
-0,47
OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variables
Percent 
Change in 
Stock Market 
Prices
Percent Change 
in Stock Market 
Prices
Percent Change 
in Stock Market 
Prices
Economic 
News
Monetary 
Policy
Political 
News
Number of 
Observations 160
International 
Agreements
Credit 
Ratings
No 
PIIGS
Explanatory 
Variables
1,59
(1,55)
Good 
News
Bad 
News Domestic Foreign PIIGS
-0,49
(-1,63)(-1,49)
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5.2. What triggers market jitters?  
 
All the coefficients in table 5.1 of regression I are – except for no news – positive, 
which is our expected outcome. It means that a news release causes a reaction 
accordingly to its nature.41 For the no news the dummy is negative because we did 
not include a negative dummy variable as you cannot categorize a day with no 
apparent news (the variable only takes on the value zero or one and not -1)42.  
 The largest effect on the stock markets can be seen following political news which 
impacts on average by 4.5 percent. Great attention was always drawn to the political 
reaction of Greece if the government is implementing a stricter control, new taxes 
and also of how the politicians in the rest of the European Union support the aid for 
the weaker countries. Also the situation of Italy, where the populist Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi with his confidence votes, contributed to instability at the stocks 
markets. In general you could say that political stability is very important especially 
during times of crisis. 
Also international agreements have a big impact on the reaction of stock markets. If a 
country is granted help with its financial problems the markets are stimulated 
positively, also vice versa. In the case for Greece this financial help saved the 
country from bankruptcy.  
In the media you might get the impression that the credit rating agencies should 
contribute to larger swings than with a coefficient of 3.9 percent. The reason that 
news regarding credit rating agencies has on average this low effect on the stock 
markets might be that a lot of time such downgrades or upgrades don’t come as a 
surprise. Many times the market has already priced in to some extent the possibility 
of a new rating of a country.  
The lowest swings are induced by news regarding monetary policy43. The coefficient 
of that dummy is roughly under 3. So there are mostly news items about buying 
bonds of risky countries and it was demanded by the economy (mostly banks) to 
stabilize and lower the spread of the interest rate a country is paying. But the effect of 
these actions does not show a high reaction on the stock indices. 
For the no news coefficient the value is -3.8 so on average days with no news are 
negative. Meaning people during a crisis tend to follow negative rumors more than 
                                               
41 A negative news leads to a market downturn and a positive one to a market rally. 
42 A more detailed analysis about the no news coefficient is given a few lines later 
43 It is significantly different from the other coefficients at a 90% level – see also for that appendix B 
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positive ones. It shows that the market is quite nervous and that the belief in it is not 
very strong. 
 
 
5.3. Is there a difference between good or bad news? 
 
The second column of table 5.1 indicates that in general the release of bad news44 
leads to higher swings in the stock exchange markets. This may be because during a 
crisis bad news lead to a rise in uncertainty whereas good news doesn’t seem to lift 
investor's spirits. 
Clearly the highest impact of good news occurs for news regarding credit ratings. 
During the European debt crisis if a rating agency upgraded or stated a positive 
outlook for a country, it was always a great sign and was an indication that the crisis 
will come to an end and that the economy is starting to get healthy again. In terms of 
bad news a large role was played by political news. Troubles of the Greece 
government at the end of October as well as the situation in Italy were responsible for 
creating political instability. As seen in the case of former Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou when he showed weakness at the end of October 2011 (as he wanted 
to make a referendum about the European austerity package, then he pulled back his 
decision and in the end he announced his resignation) for the European stock 
markets it is important that leaders show that they are capable of handling difficult 
situations. Politicians should pay extremely close attention to what they are doing as 
well what they are saying. They are in the focus of the media and also investors are 
watching the steps that they are taking to overcome the crisis.  
A big influence of bad news is also news regarding economic information. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of John H. Boyd, Javi Ragannathan and Jian 
Hu45 who find that during times of contraction, bad news regarding unemployment or 
bad growth expectations lead to a significant fall in bond prices. 
As seen in the previous column news regarding monetary policy also has the 
smallest effect in this column.  
 
 
                                               
44 See the significance test at appendix B 
45 Boyd John H., Hu Jian, Tagannathan Javi, (2001). The stock market's reaction to unemployment 
news: Why bad news is usually good for stocks 
59
 
 
5.4. Does the origin of the news matter? 
 
One would think that news originating in the own country would have more impact 
than foreign news but testing their significance leads to an ambiguous result. With the 
exception of monetary policy, political news and economic news, the origin of news 
does not matter as they are not significantly different46.  
What is interesting in this table is that economic news has a greater impact if they are 
of foreign origin. It shows that the economies of the European Union are connected 
already very closely together and that more weight – especially in the countries with a 
smaller economy – is given to economic news published in especially the big 
economic players like Germany, USA or China (which are the most important 
countries for a lot of the economies in the Eurozone acting as their main trading 
partners).  
Domestic political news plays a greater role than foreign ones since high interest is 
drawn on how politicians react to the situation the crisis has brought – a balancing act 
to cut spending but also stimulate the own economy. The role of politicians for the 
own market is higher than for other markets as they always try to satisfy the voters in 
their country first. 
If we take a closer look at the coefficients on the news variables regarding credit 
rating agencies you see that the cr_domestic is not significantly different from 
cr_foreign. This indicates that spill–over effects take place when a new rating of an 
agency comes out. If for example Greece gets downgraded then accordingly for 
example the stock exchange markets of Madrid or Lisbon also go down. So in the 
case for credit rating news you see that contagion effects are happening. 
For rumors you can see that the values of the coefficients are very similar so it does 
not really matter if a rumor is originated in a foreign or a domestic market.  
 
 
  
                                               
46 See again appendix B 
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5.4.1. Is it different if the news originated in the PIIGS47 countries? 
 
In this section we will check if there is a difference if the news are originated in the 
crisis countries. In the media these countries got the name PIIGS from the first letter 
of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. Performing a regression on these data 
you see the results in the fourth column of table 5.1. As you can see the coefficients 
of the news variables originating in the PIIGS countries and those originating outside 
are pretty similar. Testing if they are significantly different from each other leads to 
the result that they are not. So it does not really matter if the news were released in 
one of the crisis countries or not, which also indicates that the contagion effects in the 
European Union are pretty strong.  
 
 
5.5. Are market jitters persistent? 
 
In this section our focus will be to check if the market jitters that we have found are 
persistent. Clearly it is important to know if the reaction of the stock market to news is 
just a reaction on one day or if the new information still has an influence over a longer 
period. To do so we calculate the normal returns of each event. In our definition we 
estimate the normal returns by calculating out the main daily return over the ten 
trading days before a news release: 
 
𝜇𝑡 = ∑ 𝑅𝑡−𝑙10𝑙=110  
 
µ = normal return 
t = date of the event  
l = 10 = time period before the event 
R = returns on a certain day 
 
Then we compare it with the normal returns 10 days after a news release. So we are 
using a 21 day time window in which we are going to check if in the last 10 days the 
                                               
47 This term is used for the countries Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain – referring to the 
similar problems and economic situation of these countries. 
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stock index still is up or down. The results (in percent) of the days where the stock 
markets are persistent, looking at the different types of news are shown in table 5.2. 
 
 
Table 5.2: Proportion of Days with Persistent Market Jitters - Type 
 
News of Type Market Rallies Market Downturns 
Political News 0,62 *** 0,73 *** 
(4,74) (6,20) 
   
Economical News 0,9 *** 0,27 *** 
(11,05) (2,31) 
   International 
Agreements 
0,51 *** 0,33 
(3,90) (2,23) 
   
Monetary Policy 0,71 *** 0,3 ** 
(5,94) (2,67) 
   
Credit Ratings 1 (1) 0,2 * 
NA (1,87) 
    
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
 
 
With the exception of international agreements market rally news tends to have a 
high degree of persistence. It is clear that economic news are greatly persistent 
during times of crisis as it shows that the economy is going to go up again. Regarding 
market downturns only the political news are persistent over 10 days. This shows 
how important it would be to have a stable government or a sound political 
environment during a crisis.  
What we also did is doing the same procedure looking at the origin of the news. Our 
results are shown at table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Proportion of Days with Persistent Market Jitters – Origin 
 
News of Type Market Rallies Market Downturns 
Political News 0,62 *** 0,73 *** 
(4,74) (6,20) 
   
Economical News 0,9 *** 0,27 *** 
(11,05) (2,31) 
   International 
Agreements 
0,51 *** 0,33 
(3,90) (2,23) 
   
Monetary Policy 0,71 *** 0,3 ** 
(5,94) (2,67) 
   
Credit Ratings 1 (1) 0,2 * 
NA (1,87) 
      
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
 
 
Again you can see that it does not really matter where news of market rallies come 
from. With the exception of Germany good news is still persistent. Interestingly 
market downturns are persistent if the news originated in Germany as it is the biggest 
economy in the European Union.  
In general you can say that during this European debt crisis good news is persistent 
as it shows fundamentally that the downturn could be over soon. On the other hand 
downturns do not tend to be persistent as during a crisis markets tend to overreact on 
bad news and on the following days when it is looked at the situation more 
unemotionally the market is correcting its reaction. 
 
  
63
 
 
Chapter 6 
6.1. Conclusion 
 
This paper tries to give an overview of how the stock markets in Europe behaved 
during the crisis from 2010 to the end of November 2011. We have looked at how the 
variance changes during a crisis period and analyzed the situation in the different 
countries. In the strong economies that have a nearly equally balanced household – 
like Germany – they were not strongly affected at the beginning of the crisis. As the 
crisis deepened also the stock market in Germany – the DAX – started to increase its 
volatility.  
Also we gave a short overview of how the situations of the countries are during this 
crisis and the different positions regarding their budget deficit, debt level and 
economic growth. From this we can say that the general problem is the high budget 
deficit, but that every state had to face other problems related to how the crisis began 
in their country (e.g. Spain had the housing boom, Ireland the banking crisis).  
We also showed that Greece – the center of the crisis – had contagious effects on 
the other stock exchanges in Europe. The fear was that the near bankruptcy of 
Greece could be a role model for the other weaker economies of Europe like 
Portugal, Spain or France. So investors paid great attention to news published in this 
country. But the swings could not only be explained by just fundamental news data, 
we also showed that during a crisis concerns and rumors had a huge impact on stock 
markets. 
During the European sovereign debt crisis the news that affected the markets to a 
great extent where political ones. It is important that countries, especially during 
insecure times, have a secure political situation and a good leadership. Clearly you 
can see in the chaotic situations of Greece, Italy or Spain that the stock markets 
reacted very strongly to politicians that did not seem to have a concept on how to 
fight this crisis. Also, in the case of strong leadership like in Germany or after the 
resignation of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy, the markets found their confidence again and 
the stocks acted accordingly.   
In the public discussion the predominant opinion is that the rating agencies are 
responsible for a lot of the turbulences at the stock exchanges. But we showed that 
news regarding downgrades or upgrades of a country do not have that strong 
influence. 
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What we also did is to look at the reaction if new information is positive or negative. 
We showed that higher swings were caused by negative news. You can say that 
during a crisis bad news enforces uncertainty among the investors and set back their 
hopes of an upswing.  
Looking at the persistence of market rallies or downturns investors tend to keep 
buying at the stocks markets after positive news. They want to get advantage of the 
positive mood that is present whereas during market rallies they do not continue to 
sell the fallen stocks. Usually it is just a short (and heavy) downside reaction of the 
market but then investors think about it objectively and start buying the cheaper 
stocks again.  
All of these conclusions are valid during a crisis episode and showed which types of 
news were the most responsible for large stock market swings.  Doing this analysis 
showed that investors give more weight to certain information than others, which one 
might not have thought of (like the low influence of credit rating agencies). 
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Appendix A
Date Aut France Ger Gre Ire Italy Por Spain
12.01.10 -1,11 -1,06 -1,61 -5,00 -1,47 -0,81 -1,00 -0,90 
04.02.10 -2,49 -2,75 -2,45 -3,33 -2,44 -3,45 -4,98 -5,94 
09.02.10 0,29 0,15 0,24 4,96 -0,83 -0,57 0,83 0,68
26.04.10 0,99 1,17 1,16 -2,86 1,06 0,25 -3,17 0,19
27.04.10 -2,07 -3,82 -2,73 -6,00 -4,48 -3,28 -5,36 -4,19 
29.04.10 0,50 1,42 1,00 7,14 3,53 0,90 4,59 2,69
04.05.10 -4,04 -3,64 -2,60 -6,68 -4,19 -4,70 -4,21 -5,41 
06.05.10 -3,50 -2,20 -0,84 0,98 -2,43 -4,27 -2,37 -2,93 
07.05.10 -3,33 -4,60 -3,27 -2,86 -4,10 -3,27 -2,94 -3,28 
10.05.10 9,10 9,66 5,30 9,13 7,86 11,30 10,73 14,43
14.05.10 -2,95 -4,59 -3,12 -3,41 -4,25 -5,26 -4,27 -6,64 
19.05.10 -2,21 -2,92 -2,72 0,44 -4,17 -3,45 -1,92 -2,61 
25.05.10 -4,36 -2,90 -2,34 -3,46 -4,36 -3,40 -2,75 -3,05 
26.05.10 2,00 2,32 1,55 2,98 3,70 2,15 3,19 0,42
27.05.10 3,55 3,42 3,11 -0,46 3,87 4,54 3,57 3,23
04.06.10 -4,12 -2,86 -1,91 -5,03 -1,69 -3,79 -2,20 -3,80 
07.06.10 -1,42 -1,21 -0,57 -5,45 N/A -0,55 -0,39 -1,44 
11.06.10 1,04 1,11 -0,14 0,52 -0,73 1,39 0,79 3,95
29.06.10 -3,18 -4,01 -3,33 -0,88 -3,78 -4,44 -2,67 -5,45 
24.08.10 -1,65 -1,75 -1,26 -3,42 -5,78 -1,58 -0,73 -1,65 
01.09.10 2,47 3,81 2,68 1,01 2,10 3,22 0,91 3,51
01.12.10 3,74 1,63 2,66 3,85 1,84 2,41 2,97 4,44
12.01.11 1,42 2,15 1,83 5,02 0,96 3,82 2,59 5,42
14.03.11 -1,41 -1,29 -1,65 5,15 -0,85 -0,27 0,88 0,17
31.05.11 1,31 1,63 1,86 5,58 0,45 1,53 -0,20 2,13
30.06.11 1,54 1,48 1,13 1,12 0,38 1,62 3,03 2,13
06.07.11 -0,87 -0,44 -0,11 -1,75 -1,44 -2,44 -3,03 -1,22 
11.07.11 -2,61 -2,71 -2,33 -2,58 -1,47 -3,96 -4,28 -2,69 
22.07.11 0,09 0,68 3,73 5,91 1,42 -0,15 1,47 0,42
04.08.11 -3,49 -3,90 -3,40 -1,35 -3,55 -5,16 -3,26 -3,89 
08.08.11 -6,11 -4,68 -5,02 -6,00 -4,42 -2,35 -3,13 -2,44 
10.08.11 -2,18 -5,45 -5,13 -1,80 -2,29 -6,65 -1,25 -5,49 
11.08.11 2,78 2,89 3,28 -0,60 1,63 4,10 1,72 3,56
12.08.11 3,80 4,02 3,45 1,53 2,91 4,00 3,02 4,82
18.08.11 -5,24 -5,48 -5,82 -3,38 -4,35 -6,15 -4,12 -4,70 
29.08.11 2,33 2,16 2,39 14,37 1,71 2,30 2,56 2,56
30.08.11 0,59 0,18 -0,46 -4,82 0,57 -0,23 -0,12 0,59
31.08.11 3,32 3,07 2,50 -4,40 3,67 3,02 2,38 3,24
02.09.11 -3,00 -3,59 -3,36 -3,98 -3,10 -3,89 0,52 -3,40 
Daily Returns (in Percent) in days of market jitters 
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Date Aut France Ger Gre Ire Italy Por Spain
05.09.11 -4,30 -4,73 -5,27 -3,14 -3,46 -4,83 -2,82 -4,69 
07.09.11 2,36 3,63 4,07 7,98 2,92 4,24 2,16 2,77
09.09.11 -5,41 -3,60 -4,04 -0,00 -3,17 -4,93 -2,50 -4,44 
12.09.11 -3,78 -4,03 -2,27 -4,43 -2,54 -3,89 -4,19 -3,41 
14.09.11 0,34 1,87 3,36 1,67 2,06 2,69 1,39 2,70
15.09.11 2,49 3,27 3,15 -1,02 -0,15 3,55 3,10 3,63
22.09.11 -6,09 -5,25 -4,96 -3,03 -3,21 -4,52 -5,22 -4,62 
27.09.11 5,66 5,74 5,29 0,83 3,24 4,90 2,99 4,03
04.10.11 -2,66 -2,61 -2,98 -6,28 -3,50 -2,72 -2,18 -1,54 
05.10.11 5,72 4,33 4,91 0,71 2,09 3,94 2,86 3,06
12.10.11 4,17 2,42 2,21 4,75 1,89 2,93 2,28 2,05
21.10.11 2,95 2,83 3,55 5,33 1,17 2,80 1,37 2,84
27.10.11 5,82 6,28 5,35 4,82 3,76 5,49 2,61 4,96
31.10.11 -3,95 -3,16 -3,23 -0,31 -1,13 -3,82 -1,27 -2,92 
01.11.11 N/A -5,38 -5,00 -6,92 -4,27 -6,80 -3,68 -4,19 
21.11.11 -4,76 -3,41 -3,35 -3,74 -2,00 -4,74 -2,08 -3,48 
28.11.11 4,96 5,46 4,60 0,41 3,55 4,60 2,83 4,59
30.11.11 3,81 4,22 4,98 2,44 4,78 4,38 3,22 3,96
Notes: bold numbers identify market jitters
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Appendix B 
 
 
Significance Test 
 
 
Regression I 
 
 Political News 
Economic 
News 
Monetary 
Policy 
International 
Agreement 
Credit 
Rating No News 
 Political 
News - 0,3778 0.0063*** 0,4726 0,2843 0,0000*** 
Economic 
News 0,3778 - 0,0825** 0,9598 0,714 0,0000*** 
Monetary 
Policy 0.0063*** 0,0825** - 0,0736* 0,1916 0,0000*** 
International 
Agreement 0,4726 0,9598 0,0736* - 0,7567 0,0000*** 
Credit Rating 0,2843 0,714 0,1916 0,7567 - 0,0000*** 
No News 0,0000*** 0,0000*** 0,0000*** 0,0000*** 0,0000*** - 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
Regression II 
 
pn_bad  -  pn_good = 0 0,0000*** 
en_bad  -  en_good = 0 0,0000*** 
mp_bad  -  mp_good = 0 0,0006*** 
ia_bad  -  ia_good = 0 0,0000*** 
cr_bad  -  cr_good = 0 0,0000*** 
 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
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Regression III 
 
 
pn_domestic - pn_foreign = 0 0.0639* 
en_domestic - en_foreign = 0 0.0987* 
mp_domestic - mp_foreign = 0 0.0384** 
ia_domestic - ia_foreign = 0 0,2779 
cr_domestic - cr_foreign = 0 0,2562 
nn_domestic - nn_foreign = 0 0,7042 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
 
 
 
Regression IV 
 
 
pn_PIIGS - pn_nocrisis = 0 0,7053 
en_PIIGS - en_nocrisis = 0 0,6155 
mp_PIIGS - mp_nocrisis = 0 0,6715 
ia_PIIGS - ia_nocrisis = 0 0,4106 
cr_PIIGS - cr_nocrisis = 0 0,8496 
nn_PIIGS - nn_nocrisis = 0 0,4386 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicates statistical significance of 1, 5, and 10 respectively 
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